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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that models
and analyses the interaction of decision makers, called
players, under the assumptions of the rationality of players
and strategic interdependence. Each player aims to
maximise his/her gain (utility) as a best response to the
actions of the other players [1]. In a radar network, game
theoretic methods can improve the performance of the
radars by modelling their interaction as a game and
finding the state, called equilibrium, where the
performance is maximised for all radars, simultaneously.
Various game theoretic approaches have been
proposed recently for modelling and allocating resources
and shown to enhance the performance of the underlying
system. For example, interaction of a radar and a missile
has been examined through differential games [2]. The
radar aims to minimise the uncertainty of the missile’s
position by changing the filter gain, while the missile tries
to maximise this uncertainty. The interaction between a
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar [3, 4] and
an opponent is modelled as a zero-sum game in [5]. The
radar uses different signal polarisations in order to detect
the target, while the opponent uses different types of aerial
vehicles to avoid being detected. In [6] a radar with
constant false alarm rate processing aims to detect a target
equipped with a jammer as a self-defence mechanism. The
authors examined the scenarios of surface surveillance and
target detection, and used a zero-sum game to model the
interaction between the radar and the jammer. In [7], the
radar and jamming interaction was formed as a zero-sum
game using mutual information as a criterion for
optimisation. In a radar network, the problem of allocating
power that will result in target detection while maintaining
the interference at low levels was modelled as a
generalized Nash game [8]. In [9, 10], this work was
extended to a MIMO radar network. In [11], the authors
proposed a waveform allocation scheme for three different
types of receiver filters, based on potential games, that
improves the signal-to-disturbance (SDR) ratio. It has
been shown that through an iterative process of sequential
waveform adaptations the radars can reach the Nash
equilibrium and maximise their performance.
The main contributions of this work are the
generalisation of the monostatic game theoretic model of
[11] to a MIMO radar network and, most importantly, a
detailed game theoretic analysis for the proof of the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium using
the larger midpoint property (LMP) [12]. Moreover, as the
potential function in [11] also possesses the LMP, which is
instrumental for the proof of uniqueness, our analyses also
complete the proof required for uniqueness of the work in
[11].
In terms of the motivation of the work, it should be
highlighted that the work considered here is not a game
between adversaries. Instead, we consider a situation that
a group of friendly radars aim to optimise and select the
best waveforms for illumination distributively without
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requiring explicit communications among themselves. The
noncooperative game theory fits well for this purpose, as
also prescribed in [11]. In particular, the uniqueness of the
equilibrium as proved in this paper allows clusters of
radars to interact strategically and reproduce the actions of
all the other clusters without a need for exchanging any
information, hence to choose most appropriate waveforms
without a need for explicit communication among
themselves. Part of the results presented in this work also
appears in [13].
A brief introduction to game theory with an emphasis
on potential games is given in Section II. A detailed
description of the proposed model together with the game
theoretic analysis are presented in Section III. Section IV
presents the simulation results and related comments,
followed by conclusions in Section V.
Following the customary notation, all vectors appear in
bold, while the superscript H denotes the conjugate
transpose of a complex vector. The inner product between
two vectors x and y is denoted by 〈x, y〉, and ‖x‖1 denotes
the 1 norm of a vector x.
II. GAME THEORY AND POTENTIAL GAMES
The characteristics of the interaction of the players in a
game in strategic form are summarised in the triple
 = 〈N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉, which is called a game in
strategic form. The finite set of players is denoted by N ,
and has size N ∈ N. The set Si consists of the actions of
player i, while the utility of this player is given by the
function ui, ∀i ∈ N . Let S = S1 × . . . × SN. Then any
element of S is called an action profile. The solution
concept that we use in this work is the Nash equilibrium
and is defined as the action profile (s∗1 , . . . , s∗N ) ∈ S, such
that ∀i ∈ N
ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀si ∈ Si,
where the subscript –i denotes all players apart from
player i. In other words, no player can increase his/her
utility by deviating from the equilibrium, provided that the
other players follow the Nash equilibrium profile [1].
An exact potential game [14], or in short potential
game, is a type of game with the property that there exists
a global function that reflects the change in utility of a
player as a result of a change in this player’s action. This
function is called the potential of the game. In
mathematical terms, a game  = 〈N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉 is
a potential game if there exists a function P : S → R such
that ∀i ∈ N and s
–i ∈ S–i = S1 × . . . × Si–1 × Si + 1 ×
. . . × SN we have
ui(si, s−i) − ui(s ′i , s−i) = P (si, s−i) − P (s ′i , s−i), (1)
∀si, s ′i ∈ Si. Using the definition of the Nash equilibrium
in combination with the property of potential games, we
can see that any point s ∈ S that maximises P is a Nash
equilibrium [14]. Furthermore, notice that in exact
potential games, the set of points that maximise the utility
function coincide with the set of points that maximise the
potential. This property introduces a new class of potential
games, called best-response potential games as defined in
[15]. By definition, the potential function assigns a real
number to every possible action profile. Because it is not
associated with any player, it can be thought of as a
function that describes the behaviour of the set of players
as a whole. As a consequence, potential games provide the
opportunity to the players to maximise their utility and at
the same time improve the social welfare of the group
without the need for cooperation. The MIMO radar game
under this potential game setup is described in the next
section.
III. GAME THEORETICAL MODEL
A. A MIMO Radar Network
We consider a network of radars that are partitioned
into clusters to form a MIMO radar configuration.
Particularly, the network consists of C = {C1, . . . , CK}
clusters with each cluster containing M radars,
i.e., Ck = {Rk1, . . . , RkM} ∀k = 1, . . . , K. The objective
of each cluster is to achieve a good detection performance
aimed at a common target, which is measured in terms
of the SDR. We assume that radars within the same cluster
are able to communicate, while information sharing among
clusters is not feasible. As a result, intercluster interference
is unavoidable. However, clusters do not compete with
each other; hence, the interfering signals are unintentional.
The goal of each cluster is to maximize its detection
performance, while maintaining low interference levels.
In order to utilise the capabilities of the MIMO
architecture, we assume that the signals transmitted from
each radar within the same cluster are orthogonal to each
other. Transmitted signals from different clusters might be
correlated due to various reasons, including the absence of
cluster transmission synchronisation. Due to the feasibility
of communication and synchronisation of radars within
each cluster, the return signal at each radar, which is
formed of N pulses, is matched filtered with the
transmitted waveforms of all radars within the same
cluster. The return signal xkn at the nth radar in the kth
cluster can be written as
xkn =
M∑
r=1
αkrnskr +
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
Jmst
+
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γkrn,m Jmskr + nkn, (2)
where skr denotes the signal vector transmitted by the rth
radar in cluster k, i.e., Rkr. The parameter αkrn relates to
the target cross section. The vector st represents the
interference signal from radar t in the th cluster to the
radar Rkn. The penultimate term in (2) denotes the clutter
coming from all radars r = 1, . . . , M in cluster k to radar
Rkn, and γ krn,m is the coefficient describing the radar cross
section (RCS) of the clutter. The thermal noise vector
introduced at radar Rkn is denoted by nkn, and Jm is a shift
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matrix whose entries are
Jm,ij = J−m,ij =
{
1, ifj − i = m,
0, otherwise. (3)
Combining the above, the SDR for the radar Rkn is given
by
SDRkn =
Gknkn
M∑
r=1
|αkrn|2| sHkr skr |2
Gknkn
M∑
t=1
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
| γktn,m|2| sHkr Jmskt |2 +
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gtkn
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
| sHkr Jmst |2 + σ 2n
M∑
r=1
sHkr skr
, (4)
where Gtkn denotes the antenna gain for radar Rkn in the
direction of the radar Rt, for k,  ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
n, t ∈ {1, . . . , M}. The noise power is set to σ 2n = 1. The
numerator of the SDR describes the return signal echoed
by a target, while the denominator consists of the power of
clutter echoes, interference, and noise. It should be noted
that this game can be extended to multiple targets in
various range Doppler bins, but the utility of each player
in this case needs to be modified, e.g., as the SDR of the
worst case target. However, this is beyond the focus of the
work presented here.
B. Game Theoretic Formulation
Motivated by the work in [11], we model the
interaction of the clusters in the network as a potential
game. The players of the game are the K clusters of the
network, and for the remainder of the paper, the words
clusters and players will be used interchangeably. The
action set of each cluster is formed of a predefined set
of M number of N-tuple mutually orthogonal vectors that
are publicly known. Specifically, let W ⊂ CN be the
predefined set of available waveforms. Then,
∀k = 1, . . . , K
Ak = {(sk1, . . . , skM ) ∈ WM |〈skn, skr〉 = 0, ∀n,
r ∈ 1, . . . ,M with n = r,
‖skn‖2 = 1, ∀n = 1, . . . ,M}.
Note, that the set W is known; hence, the action sets are
identical for all players. We also assume that the antenna
gains Gtkn, for , k = 1, . . . , K, t, n = 1, . . . , M, are
publicly known. Because the signals have unity norm, (4)
suggests that the SDR is maximized when the
denominator is minimised. Extending the utility function
in [11] to our MIMO model, the utility function for player
k is written as follows:
uk(s1, . . . , sK ) =
−
M∑
n=1
(
M|skn|2 + Gknkn
M∑
t=1
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
∣∣γktn,m∣∣2∣∣sHkr Jmskt ∣∣2
+
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gtkn
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
∣∣sHkr Jmst ∣∣2
+
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gknt
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
∣∣sHr Jmskn∣∣2
)
.
Having defined the utility function of the player,
the game now can be described by the triple  =
〈C, {Ak}k∈{1, . . . , K}, {uk}k∈{1, . . . , K}〉. Let A =
A1 × . . .× AK. Following [11], we define the function
P : A → R to be the sum of the denominators of the SDR
of all radars in every cluster. In other words,
P (s11, . . . , s1M, . . . , sK1, . . . , sKM ) =
−
K∑
k=1
M∑
n=1
(
M|skn|2 +
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gtkn
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
∣∣sHkr Jmst ∣∣2
+Gknkn
M∑
t=1
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
∣∣γktn,m∣∣2 ∣∣sHkr Jmskt ∣∣2
)
. (5)
By isolating the terms corresponding to the kth player in
the summation in (5), we can prove that P satisfies (1), and
thus it is a potential function of the game . As mentioned
before, the set of the available waveforms W and antenna
gains are known to all players. The radars need to know
the RCS of clutters |γktn,m|2. When played distributively, it
is difficult to obtain the instantaneous values of clutter
RCS; however, this can be replaced by its statistical
average, i.e., E[|γktn,m|2], based on the knowledge of the
environment obtained, e.g., with the aid of digital terrain
maps [16]. Hence, the instantaneous RCS can be
substituted by its expected value, and as shown later in the
simulation, the advantage of the proposed distributed
optimization still prevails strongly even in the absence of
the knowledge of the instantaneous RCS.
At the beginning of the game, the players choose
randomly an M-tuple of orthogonal waveforms from their
action set Ak, for k = 1, . . . , K. Then, in a sequential
manner, they update their waveforms according to the
potential function. In particular, at round t, the player
whose turn it is to play updates the waveform (action) by
choosing the new waveform stk as
stk = arg max
sk∈Ak
P (sk, st−1−k ) = arg max
sk∈Ak
uk(sk, st−1−k ).
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This iterative process generates the following sequence of
waveforms (action profiles)
s0 = (s01, . . . , s0K ), s1 = (s11, s02, . . . , s0K ),
s2 = (s11, s22, s03, . . . , s0K−1, s0K ), . . . . (6)
This sequence is called an improvement path because at
each step, we have that uk(st) > uk(st–1) for the player k
who updates his/her action profile at time t. Notice, that
the players maximise the same objective function P with
respect to a particular dimension; hence, the order with
which they choose to act does not affect the final result of
the optimisation. As previously mentioned, the action set
A is finite, which implies that the improvement path must
be finite. When none of the players can improve further
their utility, the improvement path is maximal and
terminates at equilibrium (s∗1, . . . , s∗K ), where
s∗k = arg max
sk∈Ak
P (sk, s∗−k), ∀k = 1, . . . , K.
As mentioned before, the waveform library W and the
antenna gains are known to all players. Hence, there is no
requirement for player k to know st−1−k because he can
independently recreate the waveform sequence (6) by
using the game theoretic algorithm as if he was one of the
other players. This process is performed by all players
independently by assuming that the other players are also
strategising. Once the clusters have reached the
equilibrium, each one has determined the best waveform
for illumination. Additionally, as proved in the next
section, the equilibrium is unique; thus, it is unnecessary
for the players to agree on a starting point because they
will reach the same equilibrium independently of the
initial vector of the waveforms. However, the optimum
waveforms will need to be updated continuously because
the location of the target varies. This is because the clutter
statistics and the antenna gains may differ depending on
the range bin within which the target falls at any specific
time.
C. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Due to the finite nature of the game, in terms of both
the number of players and their action sets, the existence
of an equilibrium is guaranteed according to the Corollary
2.2 in [14], which states that every finite potential game
attains an equilibrium. In [17], it is shown that if the action
sets of all players of the potential game are convex and
compact, and additionally, the potential function is
continuously differentiable and strictly concave, then the
game has a unique Nash equilibrium. However, this result
cannot be applied to our case because the potential
function is defined over a discrete set. Therefore, we use
the results in [12] on discrete concavity for potential games
to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. We first show
that the potential function has the LMP, and then we prove
that the set of maximisers of the potential is a singleton.
PROPOSITION 1 The potential function P : A → R given
by (5) satisfies the LMP.
PROOF See the Appendix. 
COROLLARY 1.1 The set of Nash equilibria of the game
 = 〈C, {Ak}k∈{1,...,K}, {uk}k∈{1,...,K}〉 and the set
{w∗ ∈ A|w∗ = arg maxw∈A P (w)} are the same.
To show that the equilibrium of the game is unique, it
suffices to prove that the set of maximisers of the potential
function contains only one element. Following Proposition
1 in [12], the LMP implies that a local optimum of the
potential is global. Thus, the points of the discrete set
P(w) behave as the points of the image of a concave
function. The situation where the set of maximisers
{w∗ ∈ A|w∗ = arg maxw∈A P (w)} is not a singleton
occurs when there exists distinct points, w∗1, . . . ,w∗L in the
domain of P, such that P (w∗1) = . . . = P (w∗L). Because
the domain of the potential function depends entirely on
the application, the existence of a unique maximum
element depends on the particular domain of P.
Observing the potential function (5), we notice
that it is zero at the point 0, i.e., P(0) = 0, and negative
on every other w in its domain A because the gains are
positive numbers. Furthermore, P(–w) = P(w), which
means that the potential is an even function. Thus, if
(w∗1,11, . . . , w∗N,K2M ) is an equilibrium point,
then all the other maximisers belong to the set
W∗ = {−w∗1,11, w∗1,11} × {−w∗N,11, w∗N,11} × . . . ×
{−w∗1,K2M,w∗1,K2M} × {−w∗N,K2M,w∗N,K2M}. To
determine if the game has multiple equilibria, we simply
run the game theoretic algorithm with different initial
waveforms and check if the resulting equilibria are
different. We can ensure that the game has unique
equilibrium by removing all but one element that belongs
to A ∩W∗.
We conclude this section by showing that the potential
function in [11] also satisfies the LMP. The model in [11]
can be thought of as a special case of the model described
in Section III, where the clusters in the network consist of
only one radar. Thus, we can prove that the potential
function in [11], i.e., [11, eq. 6], satisfies the LMP.
COROLLARY 1.2 The potential function defined in [11],
i.e., [11, eq. 6], satisfies the LMP.
PROOF The proof follows the same steps as the proof of
Proposition 1 with M = 1. 
IV SIMULATION RESULTS: DISCUSSION
To support the theoretical model, we simulate the
interaction of clusters for a network that is formed of three
clusters, i.e., C1, C2, C3, and each cluster consists of two
radars, i.e., Ck = {Rk1, Rk2}, for k = 1, 2, 3. The action
set, which by the definition of our game is the same for all
players, consists of pairs of orthogonal waveforms that are
taken from the waveform library described in [11]. We
assume that two waveforms w, w′ are orthogonal if wH w′
≤ 10–6. The waveform library that we formed contains
121 pairs of orthogonal waveforms, (wk1, wk2) with
k = 1, 2, 3, whose elements correspond to the two radars
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TABLE I
Antenna Gains in Decibels; the Notation Gtkn Denotes the Antenna Gain of the nth Radar in Cluster k in the Direction of the Radar t in the th
Cluster.
Network with K = 3, M = 2
(G1111, G 2111, G 2211, G 3111, G3211) = (0, –30, –16, –11, –21)
(G 1212, G 2112, G 2212, G 3112, G3212) = (0, –27, –25, –27, –16)
(G 2121, G 1121, G 1221, G 3121, G3221) = (0, –13, –14, –28, –28)
(G 2222, G 1122, G 1222, G 3222, G 3222) = (0, –17, –28, –26, –11)
(G 3131, G 1131, G 1231, G2131, G2231) = (0, –19, –27, –13, –29)
(G 3232, G 1132, G 1232, G2132, G2232) = (0, –16, –11, –23, –18)
Fig. 1. Values of SDR throughout potential game and comparison with SDR evaluated using random choice of waveforms. Network consists of three
clusters each with two radars. (a) Player 1; (b) player 2; (c) player 3.
in the cluster. For the initialisation of the game, the players
choose pairs of orthogonal waveforms from their action
set randomly. The antenna gains for each radar, which are
publicly known to all players, are presented in Table I.
Recall that the notation Gtkn denotes the antenna gain for
the radar Rkn in the direction of radar Rt. The values in
Table I are randomly chosen integers from the interval
[–30 dB, –11 dB]. Note that the antenna gain Gtkn is
different from Gknt. Regarding the RCS of the clutter,
we assume that |γktn,m| ∀k, n, t follow the Weibull
distribution with parameters a = 1.1 and β = 2.6, and
E[|γktn,m|2] = 1.1170. Similarly, for the target RCS, we
take |αkrn| ∀k, n, r to follow the Rayleigh distribution with
parameter a = 2.7, and E[|αkrn|2] = 1.1161.
Fig. 1 presents the SDR achieved at each radar receiver
for each player, using the proposed game theoretic
algorithm for the considered network topology. The
performance is compared to the SDR obtained when the
players choose the waveforms randomly from the set of
waveforms (random choice model). In order to investigate
the convergence of the game, in the first simulation, we
have fixed the instantaneous RCS of the clutter to its
expected value of 1.1170. The convergence to the
equilibrium of the game theoretic algorithm is visible in
the subfigures, and the equilibrium is reached within a few
iterations. Because the equilibrium of the proposed game
is unique, the algorithm will converge to it independently
of the initial set of waveforms that were used. Hence, the
players can reach to the same Nash equilibrium regardless
of the choice of the initial waveforms and using only the
information that is publicly known. In all subfigures of
Fig. 1 we can also see the sequential update of the
waveforms: when the first player updates the waveform
that results in a better SDR, the other players continue
Fig. 2. Change in SDR values for cluster C1 as size of network
increases.
using the initial waveforms until it is their turn to play and
improve their SDRs. The same figures include the SDR
values when the clusters choose their waveforms
randomly. The results of the random choice model were
obtained by taking the average SDRs over 100
realisations. A comparison of the two models shows that
the performance of the clusters is greatly improved when
they follow the game theoretic scheme.
We obtained SDR values at equilibrium for the first
cluster averaged over all radars in the cluster, for both the
proposed game theoretic method and the random choice
model and for varying number of clusters in the network,
as depicted in Fig. 2. The number of radars in each cluster
is two. As the number of clusters increases, the
interference induced in the network increases as well,
which in turn leads to reducing the SDR values for all
clusters. However, when the clusters follow the game
theoretic algorithm, their SDR is still better than the SDR
obtained using the random waveform selection.
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TABLE II
Average SDR Evaluated at Waveforms Obtained Using the Game
Theoretic Algorithm and Waveforms Chosen at Random; the SDR Has
Been Calculated Taking into Account the Instantaneous Radar Cross
Section Coefficients.
Radar Potential Game Random Choice
Player 1 (R11, R12) (7.9040, 8.2759) (6.8046, 7.1197)
Player 2 (R21, R22) (8.6594, 9.1275) (7.5313, 8.0331)
Player 3 (R31, R32) (8.4932, 8.3141) (7.4355, 7.2650)
For the final simulation, we allowed the RCS of the
target and the clutter to take random values as prescribed
by the Rayleigh and Weibull distributions, respectively,
with the parameters mentioned earlier. The game theoretic
algorithm however assumed the expected value of the
RCS. Table II depicts the average SDR obtained using 100
random realisations of RCS, where the players use the
waveforms resulting from the game theoretic algorithm
(waveforms at equilibrium), and waveforms that have been
chosen randomly. As seen in Table II, the performance of
the radars is still much better when the players follow the
potential game as compared to the random selection of
waveforms, confirming the benefit of the proposed
approach even in the absence of exact knowledge of RCS.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a game theoretic waveform
allocation method for a network of multistatic radars.
Using results on discrete concavity, we have proven that
the Nash equilibrium of the game is unique for specific set
of waveforms that can be carefully chosen by the radar net-
work. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium allows each
cluster of radars to determine the best set of waveforms by
strategizing the actions of other clusters; hence, distributed
optimisation without a need for intercluster communication
is possible. The results show that the proposed game
theoretic method provides better performance as compared
to random allocation of waveforms even in the absence
of exact knowledge of the instantaneous RCS of clusters.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We begin by first redefining the potential function over
the real numbers. Because there exists a bijection between
the set of complex numbers C and the set R2 of ordered
pairs of real numbers, every complex number z = x + iy
can be realised as a point (x, y) in the real plane.
Generalising this to higher dimensions, let skn = xkn + iykn
∀(k, n) = {1, . . . , K} × {1, . . . , M}. Then, the potential
function can be thought of as a function over the set
AR = {(x11, y11, . . . , xKM, yKM ) ∈ R2NKM | x2kn + y2kn
= 1, ∀(k, n) = {1, . . . , K} × {1, . . . ,M}}.
For uniformity, take (x11, y11, . . . , x1M, y1M, . . . , xKM,
yKM) = (c11, c12, . . . , c12M–1, c12M, . . . , cK2M–1, cK2M) and
substituting into (5) and denoting E[|γktn,m|2] by γ˜ktn,m,
we obtain
P (c) =
−
K∑
k=1
2M∑
n=1
M c2kn −
K∑
k=1
M∑
n=1
(
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gtkn
×
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
cTk 2r−1 Jmc 2t−1 + cTk 2r Jmc 2t
)2
+
(
cTk 2r−1 Jmc 2t − cTk 2r Jmc 2t−1
)2)
+Gknkn
M∑
t=1
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜ktn,m((cTk 2r−1 Jmck 2t−1+cTk 2r Jmck 2t )
2
+ (cTk 2r−1 Jmck 2t − cTk 2r Jmck 2t−1)2)
)
(7)
The potential function is a polynomial, and as such, it does
not have any singularities over the space R2NKM. Hence,
in order to be consistent with the definition of the LMP
[12], we can transform the domain of P into a discrete
set of integers by first multiplying all elements of AR
with 10α , where α is a large positive integer, and then
applying the floor function. We call the transformed
domain AZ. Notice, that by using this transformation,
we stretch the graph of the potential by a power
of 10 and then shift it to the right by a positive number
in [0, 1). Thus, the shape of the potential will not change.
Expanding (7), we obtain
P (c1,11, . . . , cN, 11, . . . , c1,K 2M, . . . , cN,K 2M )
= −
K∑
k=1
2M∑
n=1
N∑
i=1
M c2i,kn −
K∑
k=1
M∑
n=1
(
K∑
=1
 =k
M∑
t=1
Gtkn
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci, k 2r−1Jm,ij cj, 2t−1 +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2rJm,ij cj, 2t
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2r−1Jm,ij cj, 2t −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2rJm,ij cj, 2t−1
)2)
+ Gknkn
M∑
t=1
M∑
r=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜ktn,m
((
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2r−1Jm,ij cj,k 2t−1
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2rJm,ij cj,k 2t
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2r−1Jm,ij cj,k 2t −
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ci,k 2rJm,ij cj,k 2t−1
)2))
.
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Recall that from the definition (3) of the shift matrix Jm
the diagonal elements for m = 0 are zero. This means, that
the indices i, j in the clutter terms will never take the same
value simultaneously.
Let u, v ∈ AZ such that ‖u − v‖1 = 2. Then, the two
cases to consider are:
1) |ui,kn − vi,kn| = 2 for some (i, k, n) ∈ {1, . . . , N}
× {1, . . . , K}× {1, . . . , 2M} and ui′ ,k′ ,n′
= vi′ ,k′ ,n′ ∀(i′, k′, n′) ∈ {1, . . . , N}× {1, . . . , K}
× {1, . . . , 2M} with (i′, k′, n′) = (i, k, n).
2) |ui,kn − vi,kn| = |uj,t − vj,t | = 1 for distinct
(i, k, n), (j, , t) ∈ {1, . . . , N}× {1, . . . , K}
× {1, . . . , 2M}, and ui ′ ,k′ n′ = vi′ , k′ n′ ∀(i′, k′, n′)
∈{1, . . . , N}× {1, . . . , K}× {1, . . . , 2M} with
(i′, k′, n′) = (i, k, n), (j, , t).
We examine each case separately. For the first case, let (i,
k, n) = (i0, k0, 2n0) for some (i0, k0, n0) ∈ {1, . . . ,
N}× {1, . . . , K}× {1, . . . , M}, and without loss of
generality, assume that ui0, k0 2n0 > vi0, k0 2n0, so
|ui0, k0 2n0 − vi0,k0 2n0 | = 2, or equivalently
ui0, k0 2n0 − vi0, k0 2n0 = 2, and ui ′,k′,n′ = vi ′,k′,n′
∀(i ′, k′, n′) = (i0, k0 2n0). Then,
‖u − z‖1 = ‖v − z‖1 = 1 implies that
|ui,kn − zi,kn| = |vj,t − zj,t | = 1, for some (i, k, n), (j, ,
t) ∈ {1, . . . , N}× {1, . . . , K}× {1, . . . , 2M}. However,
because ui0, k0 2n0 − vi0, k0 2n0 = 2, the only option for z is
to have{
zi,kn = ui,kn = vi,kn, if(i, k, n) = (i0, k0, 2n0)
zi0, k0 n0 = ui0, k0 2n0 − 1 = vi0, k0 2n0 + 1, otherwise
as any other cases violate the requirement
‖u − z‖1 = ‖v − z‖1 = 1. Hence, we have
max
z∈AZ :‖u−z‖1=1‖v−z‖1=1
P (z) = P (u1,11, . . . , ui0 k0 2n0 − 1, . . . , uN,K 2M )
2
+ P (v1,11, . . . , vi0 k0 2n0 + 1, . . . , vN,K 2M )
2
. (8)
For P (u1,11, . . . , ui0 k0 2n0 − 1, . . . , uN,K 2M ), instead of isolating the terms that relate to ui0,k0 2n0 − 1, we subtract the
terms with ui0,k0 n0 from P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) and then add the terms with ui0, k0 2 n0 − 1,. The resulting
expression is
P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0 − 1, . . . , uN,K 2M ) =
P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) + M(2ui0,k0 2n0 − 1)
+ (2ui0,k0 2n0 − 1)
K∑
=1
 =k0
M∑
t=1
Gtk0n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t
)2
+
(
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t−1
)2)
+ (2ui0,k0 2n0 − 1)Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0tn0,m
((
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t
)
2 +
(
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t−1
)2)
+ (2ui0,k0 2n0 − 1)Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
r=1
r =n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0n0n0,m
((
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2rJm,ii0
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2r−1 Jm,ii0
)2)
. (9)
Similarly for the term P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0 + 1, . . . , vN,K 2M ), we have
P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0 + 1, . . . , vN,K 2M ) = P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) + M(−2vi0,k0 2n0 − 1)
+ (− 2vi0,k0 2n0 − 1)
K∑
=1
 =k0
M∑
t=1
Gtk0n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t
)2
+
(
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t−1
)2)
+ (− 2vi0,k0 2n0 − 1)Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0tn0,m
((
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t
)2
+
(
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t−1
)2)
+ (− 2vi0,k0 2n0 − 1)Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
r=1
r =n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0n0n0,m
((
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2rJm,ii0
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0
)2)
. (10)
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Recall that for all (i, k, n) = (i0, k0, 2n0) we have ui,kn = vi, kn. Substituting (9) and (10) into (8), we obtain:
max
z∈AZ :‖u−z‖1=1‖v−z‖1=1
P (z) = 1
2
P (u1,11, . . . , ui0, k0 2n0 − 1, . . . , uN,K 2M ) +
1
2
P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0 + 1, . . . , vN,K 2M )
≥ 1
2
P (u) + 1
2
P (v),
where the inequality holds because ui0, k0 2n0−vi0, k0 2n0 = 2.
For the second case, without loss of generality, assume that (i, k) = (i0, 2k0) and (j, ) = (j0, 20 – 1). Then from
‖z − u‖ = ‖z − v‖ = 1, the possible values for z are zi ′, k′ n′ = ui ′, k′ n′ = vi ′, k′ n′, for all (i′, k′, n′) ∈ {1, . . . , N}× {1, . . .
, K}× {1, . . . , 2M} with (i′, k′, n′) = (i0, k0, 2n0), (j0, 0, 2t0 – 1), and when (i′, k′, n′) = (i0, k0, 2n0), (j0, 0,2t0 – 1) we
have {
zi0,k0 2n0 = ui0,k0 2n0 ± 1 = vi0,k0 2n0
zj0,0 2t0 −1 = uj0,0 2t0 −1 = vj0,0 2t0 −1 ± 1 or
{
zi0,k0 2n0 = ui0,k0 2n0 = vi0,k0 2n0 ± 1
zj0,0 2t0 −1 = uj0,0 2t0 −1 ± 1 = vj0,0 2t0 −1.
Without loss of generality, assume that 0 > k0. Then, we have
max
z∈AZ :‖u−z‖1=1‖v−z‖1=1
P (z) = max{P (u1,11 . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , uj0,0 2t0−1, . . . , uN,K 2M ),
P (v1,11 . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vj0,0 2t0−1, . . . , vN,K 2M )} ≥
P (u1,11 . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , uj0,0 2t0−1, . . . , uN,K 2M )
2
+P (v1,11 . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vj0,0 2t0, . . . , vN,K 2M )
2
, (11)
and we examine the two terms separately. Let R1 denote the terms of P (u1,11 . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) that relate to
ui0,k0 2n0, and let R2 denote the terms of P (u1,11 . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) associated with vi0,k0 2n0 :
R1 = −Mu2i0,k0 2n0 −
K∑
=1
 =k0
M∑
t=1
Gtk0n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t−1 + ui0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t
)2
+
(
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t − ui0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t−1
)2)
−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0tn0,m
((
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t−1 + ui0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t
)2
+
(
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t − ui0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t−1
)2)
−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
r=1
r =n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0n0n0,m
((
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0−1 +
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2rJm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0 −
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2rJm,ii0ui0k0 2n0−1
)2)
,
and
R2 = −Mv2i0,k0 2n0 −
K∑
=1
 =k0
M∑
t=1
Gtk0n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t−1 + vi0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj, 2t
)2
+
(
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0 juj,2t − vi0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0juj,2t−1
)2)
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−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0tn0,m
((
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t−1 + vi0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t
)2
+
(
ui0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t − vi0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0juj,k0 2t−1
)2)
−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
r=1
r =n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0n0n0,m
((
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0−1 +
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2rJm,ii0vi0,k02n0
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0vi0,k0 2n0 −
N∑
i=1
i =i0
ui,k0 2rJm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0−1
)2)
.
Recall that for all (i, k, n) = (i0, k0, n0) we have ui,kn = vi,kn, which means that R2 becomes an expression of vs. We call
the resulting expression R′2. In order to construct P (u1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ), we subtract the expression R1
from P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) and then add R′2:
P (u1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) = P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) − R1 + R′2. (12)
Similarly, for P (v1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ), we subtract from P (v1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) the terms that
relate to vi0,k0 2n0, which is the expression R′2, and then add the terms of P (v1,11 . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) associated
with ui0,k0 2n0 . We denote the latter by R3:
R3 = −Mu2i0,k0 2n0 −
K∑
=1
 =k0
M∑
t=1
Gtk0n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
((
vi0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t−1 + ui0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t
)2
+
(
vi0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t − ui0,k0 2n0
N∑
j=1
Jm,i0j vj, 2t−1
)2)
−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
t=1
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0tn0,m
((
vi0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t−1 + ui0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t
)2
+
(
vi0,k0 2n0−1
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t − ui0,k0 2r0
N∑
j=1
j =i0
Jm,i0j vj,k0 2t−1
)2)
−Gk0n0k0n0
M∑
r=1
r =n0
N−1∑
m=−N+1
m=0
γ˜k0n0n0,m
((
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0vi0,k0 2n0−1 +
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2rJm,ii0ui0,k02n0
)2
+
(
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2r−1Jm,ii0ui0,k0 2n0 −
N∑
i=1
i =i0
vi,k0 2rJm,ii0vi 0 ,k0 2n0 −1
)2)
.
Using the fact that for all (i,k,n) = (i0, k0, n0) we have ui,kn = vi,kn, expression R3 becomes R1. Hence, we
have
P (v1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) = P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) − R′2 + R1. (13)
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Substituting (12) and (13) into (11), we obtain the
following:
max
z∈AZ :‖u−z‖1=1‖v−z‖1=1
P (z) ≥ 1
2
P (u1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . ,
uN,K 2M ) + 12P (v1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M )
= 1
2
(P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M ) − R1 + R′2)
+ 1
2
(P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ) − R′2 + R1)
= 1
2
P (u1,11, . . . , ui0,k0 2n0, . . . , uN,K 2M )
+ 1
2
P (v1,11, . . . , vi0,k0 2n0, . . . , vN,K 2M ).
This concludes the proof that the potential function
satisfies the LMP.
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